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In a number of papers 1 and a forthcoming book 2 , Alex Orenstein has
argued against the modern logical orthodoxy starting from Frege. According
to Orenstein, what is usually called \existential quanti¯er" and signi¯ed by
\9" does not express existence. He rests his case on the considerations of
the di±culties that the standard treatment of \existential quanti¯cation"
has to face. One of the cases where such a di±culty arises for the standard
treatment is that of empty names.
Orenstein's discussions about empty names center around the following
argument.
Pegasus does not exist.
So, something does not exist.
About this argument, Orenstein makes three claims.
¤This was originally written as my comments on Prof. Alex Orenstein's talk at Nihon
University on January 12th, 2008. I would like to thank Prof. Orenstein and Prof. To-
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1. The premise is a contingent truth.
2. The conclusion is a contingent truth.
3. The argument is valid as it stands.
These claims seem to be contrary to the usually held view; in particular, the
second and third claims are usually considered to be plainly false. According
to the usual view, the conclusion is not a contingent truth, but a necessary
falsehood, and hence, the argument is not valid.
The reason why Orenstein can maintain such an unorthodox view is that
he refuses existential import to the so-called existential quanti¯cation, which
he calls \particular quanti¯cation" instead. His main point is that modern
logical tradition since Frege has been wrong in interpreting the quantitative
contrast of general/particular in terms of universality and existence. Thus,
according to him, the conclusion of the argument is not equivalent to the
existential claim such as
There exists something which does not exist.
which is indeed a self-contradiction.
I think there are some evidence that shows that \particular" quanti¯ca-
tion does not always have existential import. Consider the following argu-
ment.
John is looking for Pegasus.
So, John is looking for something.
This argument seems to be valid. Hence, the conclusion cannot be equivalent
to
There exists something John is looking for.
which is false, because in spite of the validity of this argument we can claim
that what John is looking for does not exist.
But it might be said that \look for" makes an intensional context and
such a context must be regarded as exceptional, even though it is not clear
how we should account for such exceptional cases. There is no reason to
think that \exist" makes an intensional context. Moreover, there are some
considerations which seem to show that it is contradictory after all to main-
tain that something does not exist, if we admit that there is a very close
relation between existence and identity. This close relationship between two
concepts can be expressed thus:
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to exist is the same as to be identical with something.
If we accept this, then to claim that
(1) something does not exist
is nothing but to claim that
(2) something is not identical with anything.
But, the following is a logical truth.
(3) everything is identical with itself.
As (2) is contradictory to (3) which is a logical truth, (2) is a logical contra-
diction, and this shows in turn that (1) itself is a logical contradiction.
I hasten to add that Orenstein is well aware of this di±culty. His way
of coping with it is to deny (3); for example, it is not true that Pegasus is
identical with Pegasus. In general, non-existents would not be self-identical.
Only existents are self-identical.
To see the possible alternatives more clearly, let us consider again the
argument we started with. The premise was this.
(4) Pegasus does not exist.
If we grant that existence can be paraphrased in terms of identity, from this
we have
(5) Pegasus is not identical with anything.
From this, by \existential generalization" we have
(6) Something is not identical with anything.
which is the same as (2) which we encountered before as a consequence of
the conclusion of the original argument.
There are various ways we might take in dealing with this argument. I can
think at least three such ways. Firstly, we might ¯nd nothing wrong with this
argument and accept it as it is. Of course, this is the way Orenstein takes.
As we saw before, if we take this course, we should deny the truth of the
principle that everything is identical with itself. We should claim that only
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existents are self-identical. Secondly, we might reject the step from (5) to (6)
as invalid. This means that we do not consider \existential generalization" as
a generally valid rule of inference. This is the way some of the free logicians
take. Finally, we might question the equivalence of (4) and (5), which might
result in severing the close tie between the concept of existence and that of
identity.
Of these three, I ¯nd the ¯rst choice is more appealing than the rest.
The second and third both seem to force us to change our logic much more
drastically than we want. In the ¯rst choice, though the unrestricted form of
the principle of self-identity no longer holds, a restricted form of it remains
valid. We should admit that identity will be no longer a logical concept,
because identity will not hold universally. But, if we retain the close tie
between existence and identity, such a consequence is not at all surprising;
for, if existence does not hold universally because some thing does not exist,
then identity does not hold universally either.
However, I am still not convinced that this is the only way we should
take. Are there any other way to deal with singular non-existentials?
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I think we can get a hint by considering a similar argument starting from a
premise which has a general term instead of a singular term like \Pegasus".
There are two versions of such arguments. One starts from the premise like
(7) A Unicorn does not exist,
and another starts from the premise with a plural noun such as
(8) Unicorns do not exist.
First, let us consider an argument which starts from (7). From this, we
infer
(9) A Unicorn is not identical with anything.
If we apply the rule of \existential generalization" to a place which is forbid-
den in a logic textbook, we get
(10) Something is not identical with anything,
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which is the same as (6).
The second version with (8) as the premise runs like this: from (8), we
infer
(11) Unicorns are not identical with anything.
As before, by an \illicit" application of \existential generalization" we get
(12) Some things are not identical with anything.
Though this is slightly di®erent from (6) (= (10)), as long as we stick to
the logical orthodoxy and hold the unrestricted validity of the principle of
self-identity, (12) is logically contradictory just as (6) or (10) is.
I suppose Orenstein regards this argument as valid in spite of a nonstan-
dard application of a standard rule, as he can accept (12) with a restriction
on the validity of the principle of self-identity. 3 But, if there were no version
of such arguments with a singular term, we would ¯nd much less appeal in
3 I also suppose that, according to Orenstein, the arguments like the following are valid.
Tame tigers do not exist. (premise)
Tame tigers are tigers. (tautology)
So, some tigers do not exist.
As he argues in Appendix C to Chapter 5 of his forthcoming book, there might be nothing
wrong with such a conclusion or an argument. Even so, let us take note that in this way
we would be able to prove that for any kind K it is a logical truth that some Ks do not
exist; it can be done thus.
Nonexistent Ks do not exist. (tautology)
Nonexistent Ks are Ks. (tautology)
So, some Ks do not exist.
But, presumably, from \some Ks do not exist" we may infer that something does not exist;
this means that the sentence \something does not exist" does not express a contingent
truth but a necessary truth, contrary to what Orenstein claims.
He might object to the second premise for a reason similar to that nonexistents are
not self-identical. Then, we can prove that it is logically true that some Ks exist by the
following argument.
Existent Ks exist. (tautology)
Existent Ks are Ks. (tautology)
So, some Ks exist.
Now we can derive \something exists" from this. This means that we have proved that
something exists as a logical truth.
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accepting these arguments. We would be content to follow the way of logic
textbooks and translate (7)/(8) and (9)/(11) to the formulas like
(70) :9x(x is a unicorn)
(90) 8x(x is a unicorn ! :9y(y = x))
and conclude that there would be no counterpart of (10) or (12) as there is
no way of applying the rule of existential generalization to (90).
If you complain that such textbook translations are not faithful to the
surface forms of the original English sentences, we can use a di®erent but
logically equivalent formulas as the translations; ¯rst, we construe \exist" as a
¯rst-order predicate which is true of everything, and, secondly, use restricted
quanti¯cation with \a" as a quanti¯er which has the same semantics as the
existential quanti¯er; the resulting formula is the following:
:(a unicorn(x)) exist (x),
which is equivalent to
:9x (unicorn (x) ^ exist (x)).
As \exist" is true of everything, this turns out to be equivalent to (70) as
desired.
So, the thought is this: if it might be possible to hold that a singular
non-existential like \Pegasus does not exist" is logically not much di®erent
from a non-existential like \Unicorns do not exist", then we might be spared
us the di±culty of getting into a conclusion like \something is not identical
with anything".
I think Quine was on the right track when he invented a predicate \pe-
gasize", but he might have invented a common noun instead of a predicate.
Moreover, \Pegasus" itself would do as such a common noun if we spell it
without the capital \P". Then, instead of \Pegasus does not exist", we will
have as a premise
(13) A pegasus does not exist,
or
(14) Pegasuses do not exist.
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Either of them will not have any unwanted consequences.
My proposal seems to violate one of the methodological principles Oren-
stein says we should conform to, because it involves construing a singular
sentence as having an import of a non-singular sentence. However, if we
were conducting this discussion in Japanese where articles are absent and a
singular/plural marking of a noun is not obligatory, there are no recognizable
syntactic or semantic di®erences between a Japanese word corresponding to
\Pegasus" and that corresponding to \unicorn". 4 I doubt that there are
singular non-existentials in distinction from non-singular ones in Japanese. 5
This might suggest that in the case of non-existentials the singular/general
distinction might not be an essential factor in getting the right logical form.
Although we might leave the matter as it is, if we were considering a
language like Japanese, I feel we should supply an account for a language
like English why it is all right to treat an empty name as if it is a common
name. In order to do that, in the next section I am going to discuss two
things; ¯rstly, I will discuss what causes the presence of empty names in our
language, and, secondly, what we should do when we realize one of the names
we have been using is an empty name. I think a consideration of the latter
point is what is missing in Orenstein's treatment of empty names, and it is
very important to ¯ll this gap in order to get a fuller view on the linguistic
phenomena involving empty names.
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Here I understand names to include personal names like \Socrates" and \Os-
sian", place names like \Tokyo" and \El Dorado", kind names like \horse"
4 The literal translation into Japanese of \Pegasus does not exist" sounds a little bit
unnatural to my ears. In a more colloquial expression, we tend to use \nado" or \nan'te"
which means \and the like". And, the exactly same thing applies to \A unicorn does not
exist". So, typical Japanese non-existentials are like the following:
Pegasasu(=Pegasus) nado(=and the like) inai(=don't exist).
Yunikon(=unicorn) nan'te(=and the like) inai(=don't exist).
The presence of such expressions suggests that within a non-existential there is a certain
pressure to have a plural subject. This suggests, in turn, that a genuinely singular non-
existential might be rare.
5 For that matter, the same seems to apply to existentials, too.
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and \unicorn", and the names of material substances like \oxygen" and
\caloric".
A name is used either with the presence of the named object or without it.
When we address a person by her name or we put the name of the material on
the bottle which contains it, we use a name with the presence of the named
object. Clearly, there is no room for an empty name in such cases.
When a name is used without the presence of the named object, its main
function is to introduce the named object into a discourse. The named object
is introduced into a discourse as a possible subject to be talked about in the
course of the discourse. In distinction from the former case, as the named
object needs not be present nearby, there is no a priori guarantee that every
name in use succeeds in naming an object. An empty name is the case in
point. If we use an empty name without knowing that it is, then we fail
to introduce any object into a discourse, and any subsequent talk involving
such a name is not really about anything. How does such a situation arise?
How do such empty names become part of our linguistic practice?
There are two ways in which an empty name comes to be part of a lin-
guistic practice. In one of these, a person or group of persons introduces
a new name without an awareness of the fact that it doe not denote any
object in reality. \Vulcan" is an example of such a case. Other examples
include \caloric", \unicorn", and \witch". Some of them like \Vulcan`" and
\caloric" are unfortunate byproducts of scienti¯c research, and some came
from mythical or religious beliefs as \unicorn" or \witch" did. Another way
in which an empty name comes to be in use is when a new name is introduced
into a linguistic practice with its perpetrator's full knowledge that it denotes
nothing, and sometimes this fact itself is the very reason to introduce the
name. Such cases are those Orenstein classi¯es under the heading \decep-
tion". You can ¯nd many fascinating examples in the real life crime stories;
in them, there are the names of non-existent companies, addresses, persons,
goods, and so on.
I think that the names in ¯ction should be distinguished from these empty
names that are found in non-¯ctional contexts. Hence, I call a name in ¯ction
\a ¯ctional name" and distinguish it from an empty name. But, we should
remember that there are names which were ¯rst introduced in a ¯ctional
context, and, for various reasons, came to be in use also in non-¯ctional
contexts afterwards. They are also included in the class of empty names.
The most remarkable fact about a ¯ctional discourse is that any reper-
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toire in our linguistic practice can appear in it; even the ¯ctional discourse
itself can be embedded within a ¯ctional discourse, as testi¯ed by numerous
examples throughout the literary history. A ¯ctional use of a name is a non-
¯ctional use of a name embedded in a ¯ction. And, such a ¯ctional use of a
name itself can be embedded again in a ¯ction, when we encounter a name in
a ¯ction in a ¯ction. As any non-¯ctional use of a name can be turned into
a ¯ctional one, it is also possible to have an empty name within a ¯ction; we
can easily imagine a ¯ction in which a gang of criminals invents a ¯ctitious
company and puts a name on it.
Any item in our ordinary linguistic repertoire can be simply embedded
into a ¯ction without any change; for example, we have the same variety of
speech acts in a ¯ction, and there are no speech acts which are only used in a
¯ction, nor those which are never used in a ¯ction. The entire vocabulary of
the language also can be put in use in a ¯ction without any changes in syntax
or semantics. And, it is rare that a new word or phrase is specially invented
for the use in a ¯ction, although such things can happen in an avant-garde
novel or a science ¯ction.
In this regard, the names in a ¯ction seem to be an exception. Although
most of the names we ¯nd in a ¯ction are the same in sound and spelling in
those already in use in non-¯ctional contexts, if we think that the reference
of a name is essential to its identity as a word, then we should count these
¯ctional names as new words; for, a ¯ctional name has never the same ref-
erence as any of the names already in use, just because it denotes nothing
which exists in reality.
Although there are many interesting problems relating to ¯ctional names,
I am going to consider only those empty names used in non-¯ctional contexts,
because I think that the problems of ¯ctional names can be approached in
a fruitful way only after we are su±ciently clear about how an empty name
works in non-¯ctional contexts; for, as I said above, the ¯ctional use of a
name is the use of a name in non-¯ctional contexts embedded in a ¯ctional
context.
So, let us go back to the non-¯ctional contexts, and ask what will happen
when we realize that one of the names we have been using has no reference
and is an empty name. Clearly, it is no longer possible to use it freely as
before, provided that we have no interests in prolonging the false appearance.
Sometimes we will just drop the practice of using the name, and no longer
bother about it. However, in many cases, we will ¯nd ourselves in a situation
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where we have to use the word again; we might ¯nd that the others still
believe that the name has a reference, or we may want to talk about the
beliefs the others or our past selves had, and we may not be able to ¯nd the
way to express these beliefs without using the name in question.
So, even after the unmasking, an empty name may not be banished from
our linguistic practice; however, it does not mean that you can use it properly
in every context. You can do that when you are reporting the beliefs the
others have or you once had, but you cannot use it, as it were, on your
own initiative. It is because you cannot intend to introduce any object into
a discourse by using the name, which you know to be incapable of doing.
Moreover, you will have to reexamine the arguments involving the empty
name; either you have to discard them altogether, or put them in some belief
context.
But there seems to be one kind of contexts where we can use the empty
name on our own initiative with the full knowledge of its emptiness; they are
the non-existentials, both singular and general. In uttering \Pegasus does
not exist" or \A unicorn does not exist", I do not intend to introduce an
object called \Pegasus" or \unicorn" into a discourse; on the contrary, I am
insisting that you can't introduce any object by the name.
When we realize a name we have been using has no reference, we know
that there must have been something wrong in the original process of intro-
ducing the name into the language. As it has no reference, it could not have
been introduced by anything similar to a baptism by which we give a name
to the object in its presence; it should have been done by means of certain
descriptions. So, we might ask what Pegasus is, or who Ossian is, and we
get answers like \it is a winged horse which the ancient Greeks thought to
exist" or \he is a poet and warrior who was supposed to exist in the third
century in those areas which are now Ireland or Scotland". Thus, when we
say that Pegasus does not exist or Ossian does not exist, what we are really
saying is that there is nothing which satis¯es the conditions which were once
thought to be satis¯ed by a certain thing or person.
Even though we seem to be using an empty name on our own initiative
when we deny the existence of its reference, we are not prepared to take the
full responsibility of using it; we are covertly appealing to the others' beliefs
which have contributed to the introduction and circulation of the name. In
the light of this, \Pegasus" in \Pegasus does not exist" should be paraphrased
as \what the others have thought `Pegasus' refers to" which, in turn, can be
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cashed in \a winged horse, etc.". So, if we invent a common noun \pegasus"
to express such a condition, then what we wish to say by \Pegasus does not
exist" can be said by \A pegasus does not exist" as well, and I believe the
latter is a better way of expressing what we wish to say.
Appendix
In this appendix I would like to show that Japanese gives a strong support to
Orenstein's claim that universal/particular quanti¯cation is closely related to
conjunction/disjunction of propositions 6 . What is striking about Japanese
is that both universal quanti¯cation and conjunction are expressed by a single
word \mo", and similarly, both particular quanti¯cation and disjunction are
expressed by a single word \ka". I doubt there might be a better example
than this that illustrates Orenstein's claim.
Let us get into details. One of the typical conjunctions in Japanese has
the following form. 7
6 But, it goes without saying that to assert a close connection between quanti¯cation
and propositional conjunction/disjunction is not the same as to endorse Orenstein's view
that \existential quanti¯cation" does not express existence.
7 A Japanese particle \to" also can be used to express a conjunction as the following
example shows.
(i) A to B to C (to) ga waratta. [A, B and C laughed.]
This is equivalent to
(ii) A ga waratta ^ B ga waratta ^ C ga waratta.
However, \to" is ambiguous between collective and distributive readings just as English
\and" is. For example,
(iii) A to B to C (to) ga atta[=met]. [A, B and C met together.]
cannnot be equivalent to any conjunction formed from \A ga atta (=A met)", \B ga atta"
and \C ga atta". Interestingly, you can use \to" and \mo" at the same time.
(iv) A to B to C mo D to E to F mo atta.
This is equivalent to
(v) A to B to C ga atta ^ D to E to F ga atta.
\Mo" always means the same as the distributive \and"; this is also true of quanti¯cation.
Thus, \Dono gakusei mo waratta" always means that each student (or every student)
laughed, in contrast to English \all" which has both distributive and collective readings.
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(1) NP1 mo NP2 mo . . . NPk mo (ga) VP.
where \ga", which is the nominative case marker, can be omitted. This is
equivalent to
(2) (NP1 ga VP) ^ (NP2 ga VP) ^ . . .^ (NPk ga VP).
Here is an example of the form (1):
(3) Kono[=this] gakusei[=student] mo kono gakusei mo kono gaku-
sei mo waratta[=laughed]. [This student and this student and
this student laughed.]
A sentence which expresses a universal quanti¯cation corresponding to
(1) has the form with the same particle \mo":
(4) Dono NP mo (ga) VP
Here is an example of it:
(5) Dono gakusei mo waratta. [Every student laughed.]
In an exactly pararell way, a disjunction and the corresponding particular
quanti¯cation have the following forms.
(6) NP1 ka NP2 ka . . . NPk ka (ga) VP.
(7) Dono NP ka (ga) VP
(6) is equivalent to
(8) (NP1 ga VP) _ (NP2 ga VP) _ . . ._ (NPk ga VP).
Here are examples of (6) and (7) respectively:
(9) Kono gakusei ka kono gakusei ka kono gakusei ka ga waratta.
[This student or this student or this student laughed.]
(10) Dono gakusei ka ga waratta. [Some student laughed.]
Thus, a conjunctive/disjunctive phrase can be simply replaced in a sen-
tence by a universal/particular quanti¯er expression without any loss of well-
formedness, and the sort of junction and quanti¯cation is signalled by the
same word. This holds not only for the subject position but also for the direct
and indirect object position, as can be seen from the following examples.
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(11) Hanako wa[=Topic] kono gakusei mo kono gakusei mo kono
gakusei mo kiraida. [Hanako hates this student and this student
and this student.]
(12) Hanako wa dono gakusei mo kiraida. [Hanako hates every
student.]
(13) Hanako wa hon[=book] o[=Obj.case] kono gakusei ka kono
gakusei ka kono gakusei ka ni[=Dat.case] ageta[=gave]. [Hanako
gave books to this student or this student or this student.]
(14) Hanako wa hon o dono gakusei ka ni ageta. [Hanako gave
books to some student.]
Thus, the general forms of Japanese conjunction/disjunction and univer-
sal/particular quanti¯cation can be expressed schematically in the following
way. Each form is accompanied by a possible formal representation.
Conjunction: © (NP1 mo NP2 mo . . . NPk mo)
©(NP1) ^ ©(NP2) ^ . . .^ ©(NPk)
Universal quanti¯cation: © (dono NP mo)
(each NP(x)) ©(x)
Disjunction: © (NP1 ka NP2 mo . . . NPk ka)
©(NP1) _ ©(NP2) _ . . ._ ©(NPk)
Particular quanti¯cation: © (dono NP ka)
(some NP(x)) ©(x)
Japanese has also the constructions similar to English ones with \every-
thing", \something", \everybody" and \somebody". Japanese words cor-
responding to these are \dore mo", \dore ka", \dare mo" and \dare ka"
respectively; note that these words are formed by post¯xing the particles
\mo" or \ka" to \dore" or \dare". 8
8 \dore", \dare" and \dono NP" are also used in forming questions as shown in the
following examples.
Dore ga ookii[=big]? [Which is big?]
Dare ga ookii? [Who is big?]
Dono gakusei ga ookii? [Which student is big?]
Note that you get quanti¯ed wentences from these, if you put \mo" or \ka" in front
of the case particle \ga". Such facts suggest that there are close connections between
quanti¯cation and question-forming in Japanese.
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So, we have universally or particularly quanti¯ed sentences such as the
following.
(15) Dore mo (ga) ookii. [Everything is big.]
(16) Dore ka ga ookii. [Something is big.]
(17) Dare mo ga waratta. [Everybody laughed.]
(18) Dare ka ga waratta. [Somebody laughed.]
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